so domestic politics involve complex entanglements of

emotions and technical issues. it may also incorporate contradictions and inconsistencies on various key issues. in other words, it does not necessarily lead to the rush into digital power independence. remaining status quo, still the majority among the taiwanese general public, but the problem is that the definition of status quo is very still in dubious. what is status quo? there's different interpretati interpretation. [inaudible] sovereignty still cover the mainland according to the constitution, taiwan has already become independent country so that no need to declare

independence. but the prc six to 1992 consensus but only on the one china part is the individual interpretation. so the one china party support the interpretation of the so-called status quo. so the general public's preference to status quo only reflect a desire of maintaining stability. it's a situation. it takes a different kind of policy. so even all these twists and turns, let us try to figure out other aspects from the economic vintages, study again, neither

-- conducted by duke university in cooperation with the national university. so in the spring of 2014, change the public for spectrum, different from general expectation as we can see from figure three in the video. figure three here shows that general public support position and enhancement, instead of weakening of economic links with the other side down the street. and also in terms of a political past, the other side, there's certain people even support --

[inaudible] again the problem is what his definition of political talks? people try to go beyond economic engagement and then go further for political talks are reflect certain degree of anxiety. so further engagement or any other interpretation. so my next interpretation in my follow-up discussion will be on economic talks with other side down the street. so from those aspects, the link of diversification of taiwan's economic links with china and taiwan on the economic security

counsel or even threat. so figure seven gives you an impression about the lack of diversity of a taiwanese investment. for instance, about 60% of taiwanese investment go to china. for these investments go to british caribbean, i doubted also transfer to china. so if you combine the two together that will be about 76%. compared to the figure out korea. the korean investment is more diversified. even though china markets -- so that will put taiwan in a kind of that economic security.

so however the relationship put in a broader context of global economic individual labor, not just bilateral economic conditions, but still have changes and opportunities and costs about the unique relations. an earlier stage of interaction taiwan relies on its unique position in the global supply chain and benefit from expansion of the mainland china's manufacturing capacities. in most cases taiwan's linkages with america and with the japanese high-tech firms help create economic niche based on mutual trust between vendors and other companies. the benefits -- [inaudible] for such a cross-border division

of labor was founded on part of the weakness of the chinese domestic ventures and the lack of know-how of chinese manufactured. china was regarded as the factory -- for global brand. but the current situation is quite different from the previous decades. china has gradually transformed itself into world markets instead of just world factory. this new situation gives indigenous mainland chinese a competitive edge over foreign ones. for instance, one of the most salient case of china mobile phone factor -- [inaudible]

even the fact china is one of the most biggest markets. high-tech firms still remain, but the general situation is changing now. taiwan's equipment manufacturing model is now facing a dire threat in the form of shrinking private margins and the rise of chinese domestic manufacturers. their own brand manufacturing model of i.t. production is constrained by the lack of marketing in the global logistics capacity. so the up and down like htc reflects the painstaking losses of the taiwanese odm model of factors.

extension of the case like fox, empire provide under the model that goes beyond medium-sized enterprise model of the open. a lot of problems or issues on the fox com model. so the rise of china's domestic manufacturers also threatens the position of the taiwanese lenders being, for instance, apples iphone supply chain. the potential rise to replace taiwanese firms position is a reflection of the strong support of indigenous firms from the chinese government. so in addition to chinese government is promoting the merger and acquisition of state owned semiconductor firms. so increasingly the chinese government has encouraged firms

to buy rather than rent innovation capability for acquisition of those, forces. the chinese companies are more than willing to take shortcuts by approaching top talents from the taiwanese competitors to expedient enhancement of their capabilities in a market presence. it's more like competition, not just among economic power but competition among taliban forces. however whether the chinese system -- can really foster innovation and attract top elites, it's a highly debatable issue. as a major agent of socialization, the chinese

higher education system has experienced major upheaval recently and ideological indoctrination. in my opinion, actually there's a lot of other issues like how to strike a balance for taiwan to have a more comprehensive and for global engagement to engage with the western world, or engage with another market, or to develop a kind of comprehensive division of labor. for instance, in addition to the economic connection, taiwan's cross pacific strategy of i.t. development is closely linked

with its security and political dependence on the united states. on the other hand, taiwan attends to join the tpp request for the domestic structure of governments. on the other hand, the formation of a new grand strategy in china such as one bill one road does not necessarily -- attempted to dealing with years dominated high-tech development. up until now they still enjoyed relative advantages and innovation and entrepreneurship, but a deepening engagement between china and the countries of continental europe broaden the horizon of china to embrace a more comprehensive global and corporative methods. so taiwanese need to think about different trends in global

division of labor in terms of economic, even security arrangements. so in my opinion taiwan needs to adjust its economic strategies to incorporate, for instance, more southeast asian countries and even european regions into its global strategies of logistics your one of the policy options to create more comprehensive economic alliances to slow the global market. such partnership does not replace the chinese market. the real purpose is to ally with new engines of global development and guaranty economic security at the same time. so the last point i'm going to introduce briefly, it's about whether cultural industry or

cultural -- could be another noon each for the taiwanese -- new niche, and to expand the global market. the cultural industry we still encounter opportunities and the challenges at the same time. the cultural industry if taiwan would try to engage with china, it is a unique, nation of state intervention, political indoctrination and the market advancement. it is not only -- but also a lucrative financial resources to local government. so the emergence of the spirit of entrepreneurship of the cultures integrated circle in taiwan will be the key for the

maturation. subject to the limitation of the market size, enhancing the economy of scale and introducing strategies of globalization are key sectors of success for taiwan's culture and creative industries and enterprises. so the chinese market need provide opportunity for these colonies, cultures, industries. let me wrap up my introductions and discussions. i think the china factor will be a key component for taiwan's global strategies of development. understanding the risks and opportunity of the rise of china from a global instead of bilateral aspect will help illuminate the road map of

taiwan's future. the rise of china as hard choices for the front in taiwan. the kind of entangling of domestic politics, international agents across the region. shouldering more risks in perceiving the channel and -- change your, more realistic world will be the only solution to reverse the inward looking tendencies of national the government in taiwan. on the other hand, in many cases cross regions have become a fixed -- of domestic governments within taiwan. issues involved, for instance, the enhancement of human resources development, improvement of environmental

protection, carrying about distribution justice, reforming our social welfare system and also immigration policy will be very important agenda for the domestic governors issues. the failure in taiwan will destroy the hard earned fruits. as the miner put in the international arena but a very robust economic and political force. taiwan test expand beyond its internal logic and imagine itself in other people's shoes. understanding the chinese, the u.s. in a global grand strategies and reposition itself in changing international

environment will be the key for the future development of taiwan. the global vision based on understanding of strength and limitation of taiwan will promote a robust solution to deadlock of domestic and global governance. i will stop here. thank you very much. [applause] >> thank you very, very much. i'm going to take advantage of the chair to ask a couple of open questions, and then we've got a lot of time for questions. one question i would have is how you see the mainland viewing cross-strait economic relations. isn't viewed as, are those

relations viewed as largely economically mutually beneficial come through transactional? or are they highly politically guided to, some people in taiwan would say sort of lower taiwan into relationship with there being controlled one way or another both economically and eventually politically? and if it is the latter, what are taiwan's options to make sure it doesn't get trapped? >> transitional period to the market economy from taiwan play the important role in providing not just capital but no out to the chinese economy. so on the other hand, not just for the central aspect but also from a local aspect, many taiwanese business people, invesinvestment capital number f vertical linkages with the local government.

but at the same time we would talk about institutionalization of cross-strait relations it is also mingled a lot of political -- about cross-strait relations, -- to the taiwanese businesspeople in china. a lot of discussions to wonder whether these taiwanese business people would be the kind of -- if there's something happening between taiwan and china. according to our research and reviews, i think these people are very smart. they know how to survive. they develop their own strategies of survival in the mainland. but if you look to the future, if such economic linkages are

based on the rule of man or interpersonal networks, that is the kind of dangerous. there's no doubt that this kind of political council mingles with economic benefits and the political consensus. that's where i think how to develop a kind of more institutionalized and for these people can survive well and also we can develop a kind of healthy division of labor in the global market, not just from the bilateral aspect. that will be very important speeches ask one more. you talk about diversification. my understanding is that the current administration has tried very hard and is trying very hard to diversify and officials including the president said many times the degree, the percentage depends on the

mainland, for example, export market has not grown. that number has grown but the percentage has not. but diversification is part of the policy and the dpp also talks a great deal about the need for diversification is not to become over to benefit i'm not talking so much about individual firms although that's part of the global economy. it is pretty clear that in certain a pretty prominent cases the mainland is sort of going to the trading partners and saying maybe this isn't a good time to do too much, not have a conference of economic cooperation agreement, for example. if beijing continues to take account of approach is there nonetheless sufficient opportunity for taiwan to diversify, to get out of that system, if you? or does it really depend on

somehow creating prc willingness to go along with that in order for taiwan to succeed in that diversification effort? >> things come late 1990s, we've talked about the policy, and also we continuously argue that we have to diversify our foreign direct investment. so i think this kind of shifting or moving out are not driven by the state policies. i really wonder about state policies, how will the state policies guide the behavior as a whole? i think probably that's also related to the structure of taiwanese firms, the majority of

the to know -- [inaudible] by the they have the capacities to have a general picture of a global logistics support. that will be difficult for them. in other cases they may move to other places to diversify, not just china but do strategy to move inland and also to pyongyang or indonesia, southeast asian countries. but as to china intervention about different kinds of trade deals between taiwan and other countries, i believe they will reduce the cost of operations for these taiwanese business people and firms. but it depends on the individual firms to find their own way to develop new territory and new

market. it has been taiwanese experiences for the past four decades or five decades how to continue this dynamic robust economic incentives, i think is very important. >> let's go to questions. we have microphones coming, and when you get a microphone could you please identify yourself, name and affiliation, and they to question sure. we have a question right back here. >> retired federal employee. you mentioned chinese versus taiwanese -- the people's republic of china have policies like organ harvesting and forced abortions, and if taiwan unifies, then it will be in beijing, not in taipei. the kind of government pursued a policy for many, many years.

so don't you think that the end of unification is really very, very bad idea? >> as you can see if you act on people the -- percentage is very, very low. so to fix that, even the current regime on the prc on the current arrangement, i think any kind of unification will be very difficult, but if it's something change in a future, probably there's some timing for talks between the two sides. but i'm not quite sure what kind of arrangement. and also a dramatic consensus and i want dramatic consensus and have won the don't think any party can go directly or secretly to talk with beijing to negotiate any kind of policy arrangement about that.

>> i would just point out the polls unfamiliar with choke 70-8% of respondents to polls opposed unification. they are not neutral so i fully endorse your point. other questions? get a microphone. >> i am from taiwan has in turn. i would like you to address important question about you say the young generations. it was mentioned that, okay, as a participant in the movement what i observed is that i wouldn't say that was the movement which is mainly opposing to china are anti-china because the are many participants that comes into this movement with different angles, like maybe against trade

policy or maybe most of them i would say it was opposing to the nontransparent procedure. so looking at the movement, another movement lately which is the one with anti-political changes, as my personal observation i think that shows that young generation doesn't, no longer concerned about taiwan under the context of anti-china but to a more pro-taiwan concept. i think the main point of those movements show that what the young generation care is that we want to decide our own future through a democracy process but not really that anti-china thing. so what is your opinions on the?

thank you. >> i totally agree with you because i got a crash for my students how to interpret our younger generation. i think it's very important the subject of each of taiwan and partly the nature pushing forces will cross relations. first of although i think, anxiety about globalization, not just for bilateral. people care about transparency at the blackbox decision-making classes and also care about -- distribution for welfare these are all side effects of globalization. so they are justified to jump out to say something to it that's why my undergrad students asked me that, don't forget to

come back to return. something also the desire of empowerment for the younger generation, people are tired about the kind of older generations style of decision-making. so it's obviously, it's a mixture. there's certain group of young people try to use their banner or flag at the china fortune. we clearly on the the autonomy of young people, but still a lot of people, probably the majority of people expressed their discontent of the government, not necessarily across state relations. also sometimes -- cross straight relations. sometimes i can put unofficial opinion. that are more problematic than me and my cohorts. so i learned a lot from our

students. it will be you. >> other questions? >> mike, director of the dpp mission here in washington. thanks very much for the presentation. on the question of going forward with taiwan's economic prospects, as you know, has lots of ideas about that, not all may be put out there yet but i guess one question i have is don't you see a future where taiwan can begin to diverse 11:00 by developing new niches for its innovative small enterprise output? taiwan sector, i.t., all they can be moving into globa globald world in a way that doesn't have to -- has to both parts working together. i think that's what the dpp would like to see it go. it's not easy understand but i

think that's where getting ready for dpp should have never happened of course. really that's what i think the discussions that are going on in the tpp at least is how do we prepare at least the duty korean free trade agreement levels, what do we have to do what i'd like some of your thoughts on that. >> i think others indicated that, we have to diversify and also tried to put china market as one part, one important component of the a global strategies. but i think the key, welcome to major important component. first, how to create art entrepreneurship, variable -- very important. try to reduce the risk and try to put itself global labor but

not upstream. if you want to move to the upstream i think have to show more responsibilities. i think that's part of the importance of entrepreneurship. if we really want to bring entrepreneurship i think that to develop this from the very bottom, from the very beginning of our education system to have a more comprehensive education and also related to our human resources politics. it's not just about salary. people are talking of low salaries. i don't think that's a major problem. so we have to have a comprehensive plan for education, for the talent, taliban forces, and whether under a democratic society like taiwan, we can foster innovation and entrepreneurship.

pure innovation is not enough. it will not create any kind of industry or entrepreneurship or even to diversify our economy. so that would be a comprehensive plan for taiwan to go beyond the old mindset of oem, manufacturing model. >> in the back. >> i am from george washington university, question is why is the anti-china attitude driving in taiwan? is mainly because mainland china's behavior, or is that mainly because of domestic politics problems backs and if it is the former region, is it possible for mainland china to change its behavior or its policy towards taiwan and make it anti-china attitude going down?

>> you ask a very broad issue. actually you can chase that two decades ago about the legacies. after 45, you all know that about -- massacre. that destroyed some basic trust among some groups of the taiwanese people are after the development of several decades after different kind of intermarriage, for instance, and also interaction, taiwan gradually developed a kind of taiwan consensus to try to figure out autonomous political entity. but as you know there is some political considerations from the other side of taiwan's streets, try to squeeze the space of the republic of china and also in taiwan.

so there will be an interactive reactions about so-called, so-called anti-china. but i told really think that whether we can combine anti-china with -- it's quite different. as the introduced in my presentation that if you put that kind in a very broader sense, that will be more moderate reactions. but as you mentioned that whether it is major roots of the problem will be the policies from the other side of talent street, i argued that more or less there's some policies which are not welcomed in taiwan so that that will cause some repercussions and reactions among the general public, including taiwan's participation in international organizations

which are not that politicized. and also even in some cultural events we also encounter some problems, and also during the lunch we've had some conversations, some asked me it's not korea's member of u.n.? yes. is iran i yes. is taiwan? no. why? why not a member of the u.n.? it's hard to explain to them because statehood is requirement in considerations. but what is in sports events, for instance, what is chinese -- taiwan or city or things like that? so how to accumulate some minimum political consensus. it takes to for cooperation and

also conflict. this may be an unfair question to you, but in light of which were talking about, do you have any thoughts on what beijing, at the end of the day, really wants in terms of the relationship with taiwan beyond the label one china? >> you mean in from beijing's aspect? >> what does beijing want speak with you mean current -- >> ultimate what does beijing trying, what is important to beijing about the cross straight relationship yonder agreement while being part of one china? what is the substance of that? where is the potential flexibility in thinking about how to actually implement something that would be called one china acceptable to beijing and also to people in taiwan? >> i think one very important

dilemma of taiwan is a that we can either use the term taiwan over. [inaudible] because when we say that one china on the interpretation, taiwan try to interpret china as republic of china but i don't think current state, atmosphere in china, prc will shift or adjust its tolerance about -- [inaudible] not taiwan, what else? what would be the real connotation of the term one china? continue to keep it as ambiguity, ambiguous term of china. but i argued that other experts were intellectuals or scholars, we know how to manipulate the importance of using ambiguity, but how to explain to the general public, just like how to

explain to my young kids or even if the students, why you continue to say the one china, probably prc and demise of legitimacy. that will be a very difficult part for both sides. >> i'm editor of taiwan communiqué, a small publication here in d.c. you were saying that in the opinion polls the definition of chinese has undergone a change of definition. by the same token i would suggest the definition of status quo has undergone a change of definition. previously it coincided more with the rather nebulous

international isolation after the 1970s, but i think more and more people in taiwan see status quo presently as a de facto independence. so doesn't that really change your analysis of what the people support in terms of status quo? >> so as i mentioned different people will have different interpretation about the current status quo. i think you are right that it may refer to de facto independence, which is the current situation of taiwan. i think the major difference is also the parties are different groups of people will be that whether weise to recognize the existence of republic of china, the '70s limited only in taiwan or mysteriously you can cover the sovereignty of the mainland -- capacities limited

to taiwan. so i think that's a major differences. second point that when people reply that i support the status quo, i just punch that people do not have ideas -- punch -- what to do next. that's why people say that i would be for status quo, unchanged. which means that people will have more comprehensive focuses, not just for the cross strait relations but for domestic politics, governance issues, or as i reflected, that it's difficult it's going to people that what is status quo, sovereignty over prc, et cetera? which means that people feel kind of anxiety about the futu

future. >> i want to fall upon thousands question the one option that never seems to be discussed is the commonwealth. when the soviet union broke up into commonwealth, british ever breaks up, yet the commonwealth. the british commonwealth. could the solution be a chinese commonwealth, a commonwealth of chinese states, kind of nominal sort of cultural but effectively the participants are politically independent? >> as mentioned it's a semantic relationship. if we really have a new arrangement our ideas, i think china should take the initiatives, not taiwan.

because in the past four decades there's a lot of discussions have one involved, commonwealth, one china rules, one dependent china, or to china's. but if taiwan take off these proposals, it's a difficult to achieve, kind of feasible solution. if china can pick up or to launch some new thinking beyond the current system, that will be an interesting development for the two sides to consider. but i'm not quite sure about taiwan, whether we can achieve any kind of domestic consensus, for any kind of commonwealth as you suggested. >> in light of what you just

said, you mentioned china branch. what they think of -- [inaudible] going to shanghai and what he would say about one china, all those things, consensus? they think this provides the flexibility is more pragmatic way because china is giving him recession. so do you think this will work? is this a modality both sides can pursuit? >> -- [inaudible] not a warm welcome in china. meaning that could be applied to level, i think of some limitations but you can see that he is very clever in his languages. for instance, he said that the one china principle is not a problem but he didn't say that whether the one china one

taiwan. so when china is not a problem. he may imply that there's no to china, only one china. but they also imply that one china one taiwan they didn't say that second part. so i think in local of old, i think he could provide a very good example. and from this probably we can't accumulate some mutual -- but i'm not quite sure whether it will be elevated to essential level without recognizing some basic principles. i don't quite think he clearly recognized this, but they say that one china principle is not a problem, and also he used the two sides belong to the same family. the merits of that is that's

what china's leaders say. you have to swallow it. so that's why -- [inaudible] same family, what will be the future? it doesn't say anything. but i think it will be a very big step to go forward but i'm not quite sure what it can be applied to the essential level or not. there's a long way to go. because looking to get details about all these issues, i noticed in the last banquets, the mayor did not attend. so that is, i'm not quite sure that's the signal or not. but anyway i think it was successful trip to china. >> central news agency. want to follow up.

regarding the 1992 conference, i remembered what he said with respect of the 1992 consensus, he understood and respected the chinese decision. i wonder both of you, how do you think, is there kind of simple that china is trying to show the flexibility and then possibly a tpp in the future once they're in the office they can apply this would? you don't have to accept it but show something like that, was that understood or something? for both of you, how possibly in the future they will come to u.s., how strictly on how less attention that you will show the foundation that he will insist or less stressful for the tpp,

what kind of signal he will try to show to tpp? thank you. >> even though the mayor is a medical doctor i believe that he still international allegiance. shanghai communiqué are sino japanese relations. that choice is very smart. respect doesn't mean that a recognized or pay attention to, doesn't mean that i acknowledge or accept. but again i think it's that local level. but mayor is very important position. but at the same time in return china doesn't say anything about appreciation about that are setting up as a model. i think it's a testing, and also share with my understanding that the mayor will have a bright

future. the visit, according to our past experiences, probably china will try to encourage u.s. to put some pressure is on taiwan, but up until now i don't see the real agenda for president she's visit, whether he will reiterate some existing policies or slogans. i'm not quite sure about that. alan may have some thoughts -- president xi. >> he sent me an e-mail this morning. [laughter] i agree. i respect and understand the chinese position. the are a lot of phrases that you can look at in the u.s. prc relationship and the japanese prc relationship, none of which says we accept the other position, but you know, we

understand and respect it. i would also point out, for example, the xi jinping talk about respecting differences, not just setting aside a respecting differences. that means except the other side's position, but yet respected them not to set them aside projected think about them and be respectful of them in a certain way. on what president xi will save when he comes here, obviously i can't divulge the content of my e-mail exchange, but i find it very strange to assume he would articulate a new position when he comes here. i think that the point that the mainland is trying to is that this is a very important moment. i think -- a crossroads in essence juncture. and people should understand

that and that they should take the position that the main event thousand on cross-strait relations of very seriously hurt i would be surprised if you would be talking in specific terms about the consequences of this or that or the other thing, including whether hoping for is that whatever administration takes office in may is going to have a position which is able to be seen as essentially a one china position. but anyway, i would not think that you would see a change and certainly not one advertised to the united states. that's not the way i think it is going to work. other questions? >> diplomat magazine. i was wondering if you could elaborate a bit on the diversification, strategy you're talking about what you mentioned

i think southeast asia and a number of european countries the i'm wondering specifically southeast asian countries, for example, you have in mind because compared to, for example, the use of the strategy, the context has changed remarkably and some of the southeast asian countries have much cause relationships with china, going back to alan romberg point, beijing might not message to be very happy about some of these countries pursuing closer relationships with top want it that means more than just pragmatic economic cooperation. thank you. >> i would argue for the taiwanese businesspeople to move to southeast asian countries. i cannot regard it as a political movement or political issues. but it depends on the firm's to make their decisions. if you can see that tendency, because otherwise of labor costs, planned cause intracoastal areas, many

taiwanese and have already moved to other places. this for small and medium-sized enterprises, from bigger enterprises like fox, they get more choices to brazil and india, not just neighboring countries. but the majority of the taiwanese small and medium-sized enterprises i'm having a hard choice i don't quite think that the political regions are diplomatic regions have a major impact on their choices. >> thank you very much. i'm a semi-retired attorney and an amateur china watcher -- china watcher for about 40 years now. starting to get the picture. i have a couple of questions for you. one, my son and future daughter-in-law graduate from university of virginia undergraduate in 1996 and i see

you got your ph.d 301995 i wonder if you might comment briefly on your dissertation and how you looked at charlottesville and whether not the other get back to charlottesville. on the cross-strait relations, i'm very curious about travel. i didn't hear your comment, or a nested if you did, i don't immigration law are, faces or anything like that as a lawyer, but what kind of documentation is required? what's the percentage of taiwanese with the award to the mainland temporarily either to travel or to live or to study? is that i don't use all of china into denominator isn't 1.4 built-in, but of the educated prc folks, what percent, what did i want to ask and then following, what effect if any has been measured on the attitudes of those people who do engage in that kind of cross-strait travel?

>> prostrate interactions -- cross-strait interaction started from visiting her relatives for the old soldiers from taiwan to meet in china, starting from the 1998 or 89, quite early. but in the first two decades is only taiwanese travelers to china. taiwan did not allow me in chinese take out the taliban. three or four years ago taiwan opened the group and an open individual backpackers, travelers from the other side of the street. also injured 2008 we began to be direct flight, that facilitate interpersonal flows. and also things i think also

four years ago taiwanese universities accept chinese students in the very beginning foreign exchange student and then registered students get in my undergrad classes, the class size at a 35 or 40, we have about three to four students from china taking my course about cross-strait relations. they did a very good job. they are good students, always tough students. so actually i really appreciate interaction among all these young people's. they learn each other. they become a by subject of study. i observe closely about interaction. i think it's a very positive. but again the are some -- for

instance, group of tourists also great some negative images. that happen not yet in taiwan but other places. so there are some positives and some not so positives impacts in terms of interpersonal. in terms of, you are talking about -- i appreciate it. also for your information, university of virginia has launched new china initiative, open office in shanghai this spring. ended april, i think april, there are four things of very different schools attended the grand opening in shanghai. so thank you for mentioning my alma mater. thank you. >> any other questions asked

yes, please. >> going back to allen's question as with beijing really wants, the future of taiwan-china relations and the suggestion of the commonwealth with china. i think china has given us, it's an idea of what it wants and that is one country, two systems. and we've seen in hong kong that has not worked out too well. i assume the people of been paying close attention what's been going on in hong kong your don't we know what china wants and is unacceptable to taiwan? >> i think the core issue is the content of the definition of the term, one china. whether one china refer to prc or whether prc want to have some flexibility about the content of the term one china. in the case of hong kong, hong

kong was not a sovereign state. so it's not a problem to change any kind of me of one china. taiwan is quite different. taiwan is a sovereign state. so if you want to solve this one country, two systems issue, you have to negotiate what it is that kind of arrangement. for the current arrangement, one prc two systems i don't quite think any market in taiwan. >> okay. go ahead. >> developments in the south china sea, half of those developments over the last year, year and a half affected attitudes on the part of the political class of r.o.c. or the well educated class as they look

at those developments? do you have any sense? can you make any comments? how do you see the situation speak with you mean situation, and pass on cross-cultural relations? >> cross-strait -- >> a powerbook or behavior or whatever we want to call it, creating artificial islands with national security implications. ..